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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MELVIN J. ABBOTT,
PlaintiffResponden t,
vs.

Case No. 16931

LaRAE VICTOR,
(a/k/a LaRae Parkes),
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought by Respondent against Appellant
seeking recognition of a 1972 Mexican divorce and seeking an
order approving the property settlement agreed upon and signed by
the parties in October of 1973.

(T. 3, 40, 41.)

Appellant, by

way of Amended Answer, admitted the Mexican divorce but made
no counterclaim regarding the property settlement.

(T. 20)

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court allowed Appellant to introduce testimony and
evidence regarding the property settlement even though no counterclaim was filed.

The court entered judgment in favor of Respondent

as to the property settlement stating:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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[d]efendant ... has by her conduct abandoned
any and all claims for rescission or voidance
of the terms and provisions of the settlement
agreement entered into on October 10, 1973;
and she is by her conduct barred and estopped
from seeking relief therefrom in this action.
(Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 2.)
The court awarded Appellant custody of the parties' three minor
children and child support of $100.00 per month per child.

The

only subject of this appeal is the trial court's decision as it
relates to the property settlement, as Respondent acknowledges
the propriety and jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify,
alter or change the child custody and support provisions of the
property agreement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial court
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent Melvin J. Abbott and Appellant LaRae Victor (aka
LaRae Parkes), were married in Salt Lake City on August 15, 1959.
(T. 35)

Four children were born as issue of the marriage, three

of whom are still minors in Appellant's custody.
Fact, Paragraph 1)

(Findings of

In 1962 the couple moved to Mr. Abbott's

father's dairy farm in Duchesne County which was the couple's
main homestead from 1962 to 1972.

(T. 37)

During this period

LaRae separated from Mr. Abbott on several occasions for time
periods of up to six months; also, the couple spent two years of
this time peri·6d in Phoenix.

(T. 58)
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In September of 1972 the parties obtained a Mexican divorce.
The divorce Decree did not attempt to divide the property or deal
with child custody.

(T. 4)

The parties talked periodically

about a property settlement during the year which followed their
divorce, but no agreement was reached.

(T. 39-40)

Less than a year after the divorce, Mrs. Abbott married
Robert Leroy Ringham.

(T. 32)

decided to go to Singapore.

She and her second husband

(T. 40)

Shortly before they left,

Mr. Abbott and LaRae were able to work out a property settlement.
(T.

40-41)
Appellant admitted at trial that between the time of the

Mexican divorce and the signing of the property agreement she had
"talked to different lawyers" regarding what her position was or
should be in regard to the settlement.

(T. 50)

Later in trial,

she claimed she was confused as to when she actually talked with
attorneys regarding the settlement agreement and stated "I don't
know whether it was before or after [the date the agreement was
signed] on that."

(T. 50-51)

Mr. Abbott retained David Sam (now Judge Sam) to draw up the
property settlement.

(T. 47,50)

Appellant read the agreement

and manifested her acceptance of it by signing it on October 10,
1973.

{T. 31, 40-41)

The agreement, however, was never sub-

mitted for approval by the court.

The agreement provided LaRae

with a mobile home that was purchased by Mr. Abbott at a cost of
$15,669.40.

In addition to purchasing the home, Mr. Abbott paid

for the set up charges.

(T. 49)

The agreement al.so gave LaRae a

-3-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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two year old Ford LTD and $50.00 a month per child for child
support.

(See, Settlement Agreement attached to Respondent's

Complaint as Exhibit "B.")

Respondent received all the assets

and debts relating to the operation of the farm plus the following:
1.

1963 Cadillac (10 years old).

2.

1955 Ford Fairlane (18 years old).

3.

Hydroswift boat purchased used for $1,000.

4.

Cemetary lot.

5.

Suzuki motorcycle.

6.

334 shares of Western General Dairies, Class D stock.

7.

Highland Dairy stock, 159 shares Class A stock;
454 shares Class C stock.

(T. 27, 28; Settlement Agreement attached
to Respondent's Complaint as Exhibit "B")
Following the signing of the settlement agreement, LaRae
remained married to Mr. Ringham for another eleven months whereupon she divorced him in September of 1974 and was married to
Eugene G. Victor that same month.

This third marriage lasted two

years, ending in divorce in September of 1976.
fourth time in February of 1978.

LaRae married a

At the time of the trial,

November 28, 1979, LaRae was separated from Mr. Parkes and had
filed for divorce.

(T. 32-33, 53)

No evidence was offered

relative to property settlements or alimony payments made or due
under any of these divorces.
In 1977 Appellant filed suit against Respondent seeking to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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have the settlement agreement amended or set aside and to have an
"equitable division" made of the property.
No. 6320, Duchesne County.)

(Victor ~ Abbott,

Appellant did not pursue her action.

Mr. Abbott's attorney noticed her deposition twice but each time
Appellant failed to appear and to tell her attorney where she
was.

(T. 11)

On September 25, 1978 a motion was granted to

strike her complaint without prejudice.

(See Exhibit "B" of

Appellant's Brief).
Mr. Abbott filed this instant action in November of 1978

primarily seeking adjudication of a court-ordered support payment
so that the Welfare Department would know what his monthly obligations were, and seeking an order approving the property settlement the parties had lived with for five years.

In addition, he

sought judicial recognition of the Mexican divorce.

At the

trial, held November 28, 1979, the District Court heard testimony
concerning the factual setting of the 1973 property settlement
and the conduct of the parties since that time.

In the court's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated January 14, 1980,
the court found that the parties had lived pursuant to the property settlement for the past six years, that Appellant's prior
action had been dismissed by her failure to attend her deposition
and that the parties had conducted themselves in such a way as to
constitute an acceptance and reliance of the property settlement.
(Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 4-6)

The court entered Judgment on

January 14, 1980 in favor of Respondent stating that the property
agreement entered into between the parties on October 10, 1973
-5-
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insofar as it pertained to division of the marital property
"is hereby valid and enforceable •.. the said defendant having
abandoned any action to void said agreement 2£1

!?.i:

her conduct,

having been estopped from asserting any claim for voidance
thereof."

(Judgment, Paragraph 1)

(emphasis added)

The court

did modify the agreement by raising the child support from $50
to $100 per month per child and by awarding custody of the
children to LaRae (Abbott) Parkes.
ARGUMENT
In this appeal, Appellant gives three reasons why the
decision of the trial court should be reversed.

First, the

Appellant alleges that an involuntary dismissal of a complaint,
without prejudice, does not constitute abandonment of a claim
raised therein so as to estop the Appellant from raising the
claim as a defendant in a subsequent action.

The Respondent's

reply to this allegation is addressed in Point I.
Second, Appellant alleges the evidence is totally insufficient to support the finding that Appellant is estopped from
seeking an equitable distribution of the parties' marital property.

Respondent's address to this claim is Point II.

Finally, Appellant alleges that she is entitled to an
equitable division of the marital property by the District Court
even if the division differs from the terms of the settlement
agreement.

This issue is addressed in Point III.
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POINT I
AN INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S
COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN A PRIOR
ACTION IS ONE FACTOR A JUDGE MAY CONSIDER
IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO APPLY THE DOCTRINES
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND LACHES TO BAR A
CLAIM COMMON TO THE PRIOR AND INSTANT ACTION
Respondent does not take issue with Appellant's argument
that an involuntary dismissal of a complaint without prejudice is
not a bar to a second action and that collateral estoppel will
not apply.
comment.

This point is so fundamental that it needs no further
It should be noted, however, that collateral estoppel

is not at issue in this case, but, rather, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel.
Where Appellant has gone awry is in asserting that Judge
Sorensen's ruling, i.e. that she was estopped to seek a modification of the property settlement, was based solely on the fact
that her prior suit was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction
for her failing to submit to discovery deposition or resist the
motion to strike her complaint.

That could be true if one con-

siders only part of what the relevant portion of the Judgment
stated, and then only if one misconstrues that part.

The rele-

vant portion of the Judgment reads as follows:
a.
The property settlement agreement entered into between the parties on
October 10, 1973 ... is hereby held valid
and enforceable as between the parties,
the said defendant having abandoned any
action to void said agreement, or, ~
her conduct, having bee~ estopped from
asserting any claim for voidance thereof.
(emphasis added)

-7-
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The Appellant, in making her argument, apparently has
ignored the alternative portion of the Judgment which is underlined above.

Also, Appellant has misconstrued that portion of

the Judgment which states "the said defendant having abandoned
any action to void said agreement."

The misinterpreted portion

of the Judgment by Appellant will be discussed at this point;
the underlined portion of the above-referenced Judgment will
be analyzed, infra.
Judge Sorensen did not base the portion of the Judgment on
which defendant relies merely on the fact that her prior action
was dismissed.

Although the Court's decision was based in part

on that fact (see, Findings of Fact, Paragraph 5), it relied
heavily on her other conduct to find that she had "abandoned any
action to void said argument."

This is pointed out in the

court's conclusions of Law, Paragraph 2, where it was held:
2. Defendant LaRae Victor Parkes
has by her conduct abandoned any and
all claims for rescission or voidance of
the terms and provisions of the settlement agreement entered into by the
parties on October 10, 1973; and she is
~ her conduct barred and estopped from
seeking relief therefrom in this action.
(emphasis added)
An analysis of the Appellant's "conduct" relating to the
abandonment of her action reveals that the dismissal of her
complaint because of her repeated failure to attend her deposition
was only one factor the Court relied on, and not the only factor
as asserted by Appellant.

Appellant offered no testimony at

trial regarding the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-8administered by the Utah State Library.
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the complaint.

She clearly had the opportunity to do so while on

the witness stand.
After Appellant's action was dismissed on September 25, 1978
she made no effort to refile a complaint.

In an effort to settle

the property rights of the parties once and for all, Respondent
on November 21, 1978 filed a complaint.

Appellant now asserts

that she could have filed another complaint similar to the one
dismissed if Respondent had not "beat her to it."
"hot" race to the courthouse in this case.

There was no

Appellant could have

in effect filed a similar complaint to the one dismissed by.
asserting a counterclaim in the present action.

She did not.

Surely, Judge Sorensen relied on this conduct as one factor
showing her lack of diligence in pursuing her action.
30)

(T. 29-

It was not until one year later at trial, and after Appellant

had recently separated from her fourth husband, that she decided
to reallege her prior claims.

These factors, considered together,

are sufficient to justify Judge Sorensen's conclusion that
Appellant by her "conduct" abandoned her cause of action.

This

conclusion is reinforced when considered together with the
conduct of Appellant which had taken place from the time the
settlement agreement was filed up to the time Appellant had her
complaint dismissed.

These factors will be discussed, infra.

In any event, it should be noted that the court's Judgment
was in the alternative; i.e., the court gave two separate and
distinct grounds for finding that the property settlement was
valid and should not be modified.

This Court's upholding of

-9-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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either ground will be sufficient to sustain the Judgment.

The

second ground will be discussed in the following Point II.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT
APPELLANT'S ACTIONS FROM THE TIME SHE
SIGNED THE AGREEMENT UNTIL SHE CHALLENGED IT JUSTIFY THE USE OF THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES.
RESPONDENT HAS RELIED ON THESE ACTIONS
TO HIS DETRIMENT.
As stated above, the alternative portion of the court's
Judgment upholds the settlement agreement as valid and enforceable because Appellant "by her conduct" is "estopped from
asserting any claim for voidance thereof."
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is very appropriate to
this case.

Many Utah cases have commented on the requirements

for the use of the doctrine.

For example, in Farmers & Merch.

Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d
1045 (1955) the court stated:
Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon
the notion that, when one person makes
representations to another which warrant
the latter in acting in a given way, the
one making such representations will not
be permitted to change his position when
such would bring about inequitable
consequences to the other person, who
relied on the representations and acted
thereon in good faith.
Id. at 1048, citing J.T. Fargason Co.
Cir.).

See also, Carnesecca

~

~Furst,

287 F. 306 (8th

Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 {Utah

1977); J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 903
(Utah 1975).
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Appellant has made representations to Respondent that would
justify him in relying on the property agreement as being valid.
Contrary to Appellant's assertions, the record is full of such
representations.

First, she read the agreement and agreed to it

by signing it on October 10, 1973.

(T. 31, 40-41)

Second, she

discussed the agreement alone with several attorneys shortly
before or after signing it (T. 50-51) and again manifested her
acceptance of it by not objecting at that time.

Third, she lived

and abided by the terms of the agreement for over four years and
with a second and third husband before ever making an objection.
(T. 32-33)

Note, the court specifically found in its Findings of

Fact that both parties have lived pursuant to the agreement from
1973 to the present time.

(Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4)

The

court further found that Appellant entered into her second, third
and fourth marriages in reliance on the property settlement.
(Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4)

Last, she executed all documents

of conveyance to effectuate the terms and provisions of the
property settlement thus assenting to it.

(Findings of Fact,

Paragraph 4)
Also, Respondent, in good faith, has relied to his detriment
on Appellant's representations.

Respondent has changed his form

of livelihood from a dairy farmer to a cattle rancher.

(T. 63-66)

As a result, he has had to purchase new equipment and finance the
cattle operation which has caused him to incur debt which has
stayed around $40,000 for the last four years.

If Appellant were

now allowed to force a sale of some of Respondent's cattle or
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needed grazing land for her benefit, Respondent would be left
with a larger debt and a diminished capacity to repay it.
Respondent is making a meager living as a cattle rancher and
is barely able to support himself and meet his child support
obligations.

His taxable income (loss) for the last five years

has been as follows:
( $ 3 5 , 0 0 0) ; 19 7 5 -

1978 - $14,000; 1977 - $14,000; 1976 -

( $14 , 0 0 0) ; and 19 7 4 -

( $1 0 , 0 0 0) .

( T. 6 6)

Respondent will suffer great detriment and damage if any of the
assets relating to the cattle operation are taken away from him
at this point in time.
The record also supports a finding that the related doctrine
of laches should apply.

Appellant, in her Brief, cites Leaver

v. Grose, No. 16477 (Utah Supreme Court, decided April 2, 1980)
for the proposition that two elements must be established for the
defense of laches to apply.

First, the lack of diligence on the

part of the party the doctrine is being asserted against, and
second, an injury to the party asserting the defense owing to the
lack of diligence.

State of Utah Bulletin, May 1, 1980 at 56.

Appellant boldly states in relation to the first element
that there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate the
reasons for the four year wait in filing her complaint (which was
later dismissed) or whether it was reasonable or justifiable
under the circumstances.

This is not the case.

The record

clearly reflects reasons for the long wait; however, none of them
help Appellant.

As noted, she read and signed the agreement,

discussed it privately with several attorneys and she lived under
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it with two husbands and for four years.
satisfied with it during this time.

Apparently, she was

Certainly it was Appellant's

burden to establish why her actions in waiting four years were
reasonable or justifiable.

This she did not do.

Counsel for

Appellant "speculates" in her Brief on appeal as to a possible
explanation for the inaction, to wit: impecuniosity.
"speculation" is completely irrelevant.
court to establish any justification.

Such

Appellant had her day in
She cannot now dream up a

reason which was not supported by evidence at trial.
Appellant next states that Respondent failed to establish
the elements of laches.

She quotes Papanikolas Bros. Ent.

~

Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256,

(Utah 1975) for

the proposition that laches is not merely delay.

By so doing,

she has apparently conceded to her lack of diligence (first
element) .

She then states that there is no evidence other than

delay on which the trial court could base a finding on the
applicability of this defense.

This is not so.

The evidence

establishes that the second element, i.e. an injury to the party
asserting the defense owing to such lack of diligence, is present.
The injury to Respondent caused by his detrimental reliance on
Appellant's actions was discussed above.
This Court noted in Papanikolas, supra, that a reviewing
Court must tread lightly in interfering with the trial court's
discretion in this area.

The court stated:

The existence of laches is one to
be determined primarily by the trial
court; and reviewing courts will not
-13-
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interfere with the exercise of the trial
court's discretion in the matter, unless
it appears that a manifest injustice has
been done, or the decision cannot
reasonably be supported by the evidence.
Id. at 1260.
The decision of the trial court is clearly supported by the
evidence and no injustice has been shown that would require any
different division of the marital property than that agreed to and
accomplished by the parties four years earlier.
POINT III
ALTHOUGH THE DISTRICT COURT HAS DISCRETIONARY
AUTHORITY BY STATUTE TO MODIFY A PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES, IT
NEED NOT DO SO WHERE BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO
IT ORIGINALLY AND WHERE A PARTY'S SUBSEQUENT
CONDUCT JUSTIFIES THE USE OF THE EQUITABLE
DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(1) states:
When a decree of divorce is made,
the court may make such orders in relation to the:-=-.property and parties ..•
as may be equitable. The court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to make
such subsequent changes or new orders
with respect to ... the distribution of
the property as shall be reasonable and
necessary.
(emphasis added)
The language of the statute is permissive, not mandatory as
Appellant would like the Court to believe.

Although the lower

court was not required to, it did take testimony as to the fairness of the property distribution.

It was established that

Appellant received a mobile home at a cost of $15,699.40, a twoyear old Ford LTD, and $50 a month per child for child support.
(See, Statement of Facts, supra.)
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As to the items of property Mr. Abbott received and the
court's scrutiny of those items, the following excerpt from the
trial transcript is relevant:
MR. WILKERSON:
... our position is
that in looking at the property of the
parties, both listed in the settlement
agreement and his answers to interrogatories, we say this was not an equitable
contract and the court of law is not
bound to follow it. As you can see he
received all of the real property and
most of the personal property.
THE COURT:
I take it that was an
operating, going dairy business, is that
correct? Is there anything in Paragraph
5, except for the mining interests at
the tail end of it, that do not bear
directly on the dairy operation?

***
THE COURT: All right. What I am
going to do is I am going to recess ...
See if you can determine ... if there is
any property in the rest of Paragraph 5
that is not directly involved in the
dairy operation.

***
MR. HINTZE: Your Honor, as to also
identify those items under number five
of the property settlement agreement
which did not directly pertain to the
operation of the dairy business, we have
agreed on five and disagree on a couple
of others. But the ones that we do
agree on is that the 1963 Cadillac which
was then ten years old was not used
directly in the dairy.
THE COURT:
rule there.

There is a diminimous

MR. HINTZE: And the 1955 Ford
Fairlane, which was an eighteen year old
vehicle

-15-
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THE COURT: The diminimous rule
applies there too, doesn't it?
MR. HINTZE: Yes. A Hydroswift
boat purchased used for a Thousand
Dollars.
I don't know how many years
before 1973.
THE COURT: I guess the cemetary
lot isn't used in the dairy business
either.
MR. HINTZE:
The Suzuki motorcycle
and the cemetery lot. Those five we
would acknowledge do not have a direct
relationship with the operation of the
dairy.
The balance of those items we
submit, Your Honor, are directly related
to the operation of the dairy, and Mr.
Wilkerson takes exception to a couple of
those.
MR. WILKERSON: We take exception
to the fact that the shares of stock
would necessarily have to be included to
operate the dairy.
THE COURT: You mean General Dairies,
Inc. in Highland Dairy?
MR. WILKERSON: Yes. They may have
been obtained through the process of
operating the dairy, but they are not
necessary to the operation of it.
THE COURT:

Very well.

(T. 24-25, 27-28)
Although the court did not feel the need to incorporate a
finding of the fairness of the property settlement into its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law because of the application of the doctrines of abandonment, estoppel and laches, it
can be inferred that the court was satisfied with the property
division.

Respondent received those items which were necessary
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to the operation of the dairy.

Those items were necessary for

Respondent to (1) make a living,

(2) meet his child support

obligations, and (3) make the monthly payments on Appellant's
mobile home.
times.)

(These payments have been kept current at all

(T. 24)

In addition to the dairy assets and the debts

associated with them, Respondent received a few other items most
of which the court ruled to be diminimous; moreover, Respondent
also assumed the debt on the mobile home.
festly unjust" settlement.

This was not a "mani-

Under Utah Code Annotated, Section

30-3-5(1), the court clearly had the discretion whether or not to
modify the settlement agreement and the court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to do so under the facts of this case.
Certainly it did not merely "rubberstamp" the previous agreement
as Appellant charges.

The court's decision was made after taking

testimony as to who received what and after considering all of
the facts unique to the case.
Appellant's last argument is that the court's discretion
under Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(1), to modify a property settlement cannot be totally defeated by a contract or
agreement between the divorcing parties.

While Respondent takes

no issue with this proposition as a general rule, it has always
been the rule that each such application of said rule is on an
ad hoc basis.

Appellant cites three cases -as authority for the

court to disregard the settlement agreement and remand this case
to the District court for a modification of it.

The application

of the principles from these cases to the facts of this case is

-17-
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at best questionable.
The reliance which the Appellant places on Callister v.
Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 (1953) is totally unfounded.
Appellant reasons from Callister that a court can disregard a
property settlement argument entered into by the parties because
in the middle of an emotional period of marriage breakdown or
separation or divorce, the parties may agree to a division which,
in light of all the circumstances, may be unfair.

The problem

with this argument is that Appellant was not in the middle of
such an emotional period when she entered into the agreement.
The couple had been divorced for over a year and Appellant was
remarried at the time the property agreement was entered into.
No allegation nor proof was made of fraud, duress or undue
influence.
Appellant's reliance on Mathie

~Mathie,

363 P.2d 779 (1961) is likewise unfounded.

12 Utah 2d 116,

In Mathie the Court

recognized that a District Court could make a property division
inconsistent with a contract entered into between the parties.
Moreover, as noted by Appellant, the Court stated that careful
scrutiny should be given to such agreements before they are given
effect.

Id. at 784.

The problem with relying on Mathie is that

the facts were far from similar to the instant case.

In Mathie

the plaintiff, who was granted a Decree of Divorce, was appealing
the property disposition made therein.

The parties in that case

had not lived under the agreement for years and without complaining of it as in this action.

There were no grounds for the
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application of estoppel, abandonment or laches in that case.
Neither did the case involve an unproductive family farm which
was being retained by the husband in order to make a meager
living and meet his support obligations.

And last, it did not

involve an ex-wife who was complaining of the agreement only
after receiving all of the benefits provided to her under the
agreement.
The case of Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977)
likewise involved an appeal from a divorce proceeding contesting
a division of the property made by the trial court that was
different from the parties' stipulation.

The case contains none

of the unique facts of the instant action that transpired since
the adoption of the agreement by the parties.
This Court in Blair

~Blair,

40 Utah 306, 121 P. 19 (1912)

pointed out the great discretion a trial judge has in awarding
permanent alimony in divorce actions.

The District Court had

awarded the ex-wife $4,500 in permanent alimony while allowing
the husband to retain farm property which was not very productive
but which had a value of around $40,000 and which he had accumulated before the marriage.

This Court upheld the distribution

finding that it was not so inequitable or inadequate as to
justify reversal on the ground of abuse of discretion.

The Court

noted that in awarding alimony and fixing the amount thereof,
the trial court should consider all of the circumstances of the
particular case such as, among other things, the amount of property owned by the husband, his capabilities and opportunities

-19-
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for earning money, and whether or not the husband's property is
productive.

Id. at 21.

The Court specifically noted that the

property in question consisted principally of farming lands and
improvements thereon, and was not very productive.

Id.

The

Court in Blair seemed to place primary importance on the fact
that the husband relied on the farm as a source of meager income.
In Anderson

~Anderson,

18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192 (1967)

this Court stated in reliance on Blair:
The court frequently emphasizes
that "no firm rule can be uniformly
applied in all divorce cases, .•• each
must be determined upon the basis of the
immediate fact situation . . . . [R]ecent
pronouncements of this court, and the
policy to which we adhere, are to the
effect that the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in such
matters and that his judgment should not
be changed lightly, and in fact, not at
all, unless it works such a manifest
injustice or inequity as to indicate a
clear abuse of discretion.
The extent of this discretion is
emphasized by the great disparity of
results allowed in differing factual
situations. In Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah
306, 121 P. 19, 38 L.R:A., N.S., 269
(1912), the court upheld a property
division awarding $40,000 to the husband
and $4,500 to the wife, even though the
divorce had been granted in her favor.
At the other extreme, in Wilson, supra,
where "the court awarded her substantially
all of the property possessed by the
parties" (in excess of $20,000 to the
wife and approximately $500 to the
husband}, the decree was also affirmed.
Anderson at 192-93
Based on the facts of the instant case, the trial court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-20administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

clearly did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify the
property settlement agreement.

The alleged disparity, if any,

of the property division in the agreement is not patently
"inequitable" considering the nature and source of the real
property, and its use, value and productivity.

It was not

challenged, and when the subsequent acts and omissions of the
Appellant are taken into consideration, the trial court's decision should be upheld with greater justification.

Moreover, the

court found in its Judgment that the settlement agreement was
"valid and enforceable as between the parties"; this is tantamount to finding that there was nothing so inequitable as to
suggest the agreement be revised by the court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the facts of this case and the applicable rules of
law, the Respondent requests that this Honorable Court affirm the
judgment of the lower court.

Respectfully submitted,

~a~)~

Harold A. Hintze
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
Attorneys for Respondent
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